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MacIntyre: Neo-Aristotelianism and Organization Theory 
 




The inclusion of a work on Alasdair MacIntyre in this volume is appropriate not least because 
MacIntyre has always taken organizations seriously as objects of philosophical attention. 
How then can organizational analysis benefit from his work? To answer this question we 
make two distinct but mutually supporting cases. First that MacIntyre shows how 
organization theory need not draw relativist conclusions from hermeneutic premises and 
second that MacIntyre’s ‘goods-virtues-practices-institutions’ framework overcomes the 
division between organization theory and organizational ethics. 
 
We proceed in three parts. First we will contextualise MacIntyre’s project in relation to a 
philosophical tradition whose impact upon organization theory is indubitable – hermeneutics. 
This case will involve a consideration of MacIntyre’s use and transformation of hermeneutics 
through his conception of tradition. Second we will review MacIntyre’s ‘general theory’ of 
goods, virtues, practices and institutions. This part will include a brief comparison with ‘old’ 
institutional theory (Selznick 1996, Stinchcombe 1997) and introduce the concept of “reasons 
for action”. In the third part we will draw together these strands to demonstrate the difference 
between MacIntyrean organization analysis and an alternative hermeneutical / institutional 
approach through a worked example – Karl Weick and Karen Sutcliffe’s analysis of the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary as a culture of entrapment (2003).  
  
A conclusion will present a case for a research agenda for MacIntyrean empirics in 
organization studies.  
 
Part One. Practices – Hermeneutic and MacIntyrean 
 
1.1 MacIntyre in Context 
 
One way of locating Alasdair MacIntyre’s philosophical project is in relation to the recovery of 
Aristotelian practical philosophy in the neo-Aristotelianism of the twentieth century.  Whilst 
the incautious reader may see MacIntyre only in terms of his proximity to this movement, 
more can be learned if we attend also to his disputes with it.  From Heidigger onwards neo-
Aristotelian practical philosophy has influenced philosophical genres from literary criticism to 
political philosophy.  It is a tradition which seeks to rescue Aristotelian texts both from what it 
sees as their errors, particularly their metaphysical theoria and from the later historicism 
through which Aristotle is seen through the lens of later philosophical figures or concepts 
(Knight 2007: 89). 
 
In place of a universalising theoria of being is juxtaposed a philosophy of praxis in which it is 
the living activity of human beings that both creates and delimits human understanding. From 
such a premise Heidegger renders Aristotle as the philosopher of praxis and nothing else – 
for there is nothing else.  Figures including Strauss, Arendt and Gadamer extend this 
reduction of the Aristotelian tradition to variants of practical philosophy whilst the unhappy 
relation of such projects to anything that can be reasonably labelled Aristotelian is a case 
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made by Riedel’s teleology in one way, and Ritter’s institutionalism in another (Knight 2007: 
92-3). 
 
According to Knight such neo-Aristotelianism is inherently conservative whether in its 
hermeneutic or more explicitly political form, in three ways.  Firstly its exclusion of theoria 
bounds all practical judgments in the ethos of the present – thus removing the basis for 
radical critique or action; secondly its institutionalism provides philosophical grounds for a 
permanent elite and thirdly its celebration of praxis involves a denigration of production (ibid. 
100-101).    
 
By contrast MacIntyre recovers both Aristotle’s practical and theoretical philosophy through 
his notion of tradition, overcomes the division between praxis and production through his 
distinctive conception of practice and provides a critique of institutions qua institutions in his 
general theory of  ‘goods, virtues, practices and institutions’.  MacIntyre thus rejects all three 
neo-Aristotelian positions whilst assimilating many of the insights of neo-Aristotelian 
hermeneutics.   
 
The prudence of introducing the implications of Alasdair MacIntyre’s work through its 
relationship to hermeneutics has already been argued (Smith 1999: 327) but if our summary 
of Knight’s argument is accurate then this also accounts for its relationship with neo-
Aristotelianism. This project is aided by the prodigious quantities of MacIntyre’s work about 
and in conversation with hermeneutics.  Having been producing philosophical material for 
over 55 years, MacIntyre has, since the 1981 publication of After Virtue,2 developed an 
Aristotelian and subsequently Thomistic account of moral philosophy. His uniqueness in this 
endeavour is in his association of the Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions with Marxism. 
 
This combination, described by Knight as “Revolutionary Aristotelianism” (Knight 2007) might 
have little chance of success given that the only thing that Marxists and Thomists can agree 
about is their mutual incompatibility. And yet MacIntyre remains one of the great figures of 
twentieth century moral philosophy, the subject of a veritable mini-industry of publications 
(Murphy 2003, D’Andrea 2007, Knight 2007, Blackledge & Davidson 2008), with an 
international academic society devoted to pursuing his project3 and use of his work made 
across the social sciences.  
 
1.2 The Self-Images of the Age. The Self-Images of Organization Theory 
 
In Alfred Hitchcock’s 1972 thriller ‘Frenzy’ the psychopathic leading character visits 
Duckworth’s London Bookshop. The camera pauses over the window display of 
multitudinous copies of Against the Self Images of the Age, a collection of 1960s essays by 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1971). Legend has it that this shot was deliberate. MacIntyre’s title for 
the collection reflects his ongoing concern with the intimacy of the relationship between 
agents’ behaviour, self-understandings and the social structures they inhabit. In line with the 
hermeneutic tradition, he holds that it is an error, but an important error, to believe that the 
idioms and theoretical insights upon which our self-images depend, constitute a neutral 
representation of some external reality:4  
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“there is no way for the historian or social scientist to locate himself outside some 
tradition of interpretation, the very language he speaks and writes is so shaped by 
tradition that he cannot evade it.” (MacIntyre 1980: 177) 
 
The narratives through which agents understand their lives are profoundly affected by the 
extent of their participation in and commitments to particular tradition-informed social 
practices, those which enable agents to answer such questions as ‘What are you doing?’ and 
‘Why are you doing that?’. Intelligible answers to such questions are available only to those 
who share narrative traditions. MacIntyre’s definition is disarmingly simple: 
 
“A living tradition … is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an 
argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition. Within a 
tradition the pursuit of goods extends through generations, sometimes through many 
generations. Hence the individual’s search for his or her good is generally and 
characteristically conducted within a context defined by those traditions of which the 
individual’s life is a part, and this is true both of those goods which are internal to 
practices and of the goods of a single life.” (MacIntyre 2007: 222) 
 
How does this differ from the hermeneutic understanding of our boundedness by historically 
situated interpretations? The hermeneutic tradition maintains that  
 
 “Understanding can never really be grounded because it is itself the ground, the 
floor on which we are always already standing.” (Grondin 2003: 284)  
 
For hermeneutics our inability to move beyond language dissolves the distinction between 
truth and rational justification. Hence for Gadamer we must “get away from objectivist naïveté 
and destroy the illusion of a truth that is separate from the standpoint of the one doing the 
understanding” (Gadamer 2001: 46) and for Habermas the limits of any radical intent involve 
the creation of spaces for ideal speech acts involving the recognition that we cannot move 
beyond speech to any notion of truth.5  
 
In Organization Theory, leading authorities such as Burrell & Morgan (1979), Smircich 
(1983), Martin (1992) and many others offer us collections of paradigms distinguished by 
ontological and epistemological assumptions between the merits of which we may rationally 
offer no argument. The differences between paradigms are so fundamental as to entail 
mutual exclusivity (Burrell & Morgan 1979: 25) and thus the argument entails relativism. 
Even Tsoukas & Cummings’ (1997) sympathetic call for neo-Aristotelianism in organization 
studies shares this perspectivist-relativist position. Neo-Aristotelianism provides merely a 
“helpful” (672) turn in the project of thinking differently (676) about organizations, particularly 
those in which a certain type of phronetic work predominates (663-668). They recognise that 
their claims will have force only for those who share “the assumption that thinking differently 
is something that management theory takes to be important” (676, emphasis retained). 
 
As to why this is important and why its helpfulness provides a reason for action, Tsoukas & 
Cummings can provide no answer. From a MacIntyrean perspective their reduction of neo-
Aristotelianism to just another set of methods and foci for empirical research is intimately 
related to their inability to make a case for any method in terms of truth. Tsoukas & 
Cummings’ Foucauldian project misrepresents the nature of MacIntyre’s claims, not least of 
which are those that address the implications of Aristotelianism for truth and for its 
relationship to method. As Porter (2003: 46) notes, for MacIntyre, beyond the perspectivist 
and relativist positions “there is a third alternative, the possibility that the development of 
traditions, both internally and in relation to one another, can itself be considered to be a 
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genuinely rational process that, if it goes well, moves in the direction of an ever-fuller grasp 
of reality”. 
 
So, for MacIntyre, arguments towards conclusions, such as those of Tsoukas & Cummings 
toward the conclusion that organization studies would benefit from a re-appropriation of neo-
Aristotelianism, are intelligible only if arguments as such can be construed as better or 
worse, and this is intelligible only in the context of movement towards or away from some 
perfectable understanding (MacIntyre 1990b). Reames summarises MacIntyre’s position 
well: 
 
“The metaphysical good norms all traditions, and hence in a sense one might want to 
say that it transcends traditions. But because the good would be perfectly understood 
in a perfected tradition, and because such a perfected tradition is already the telos of 
traditional rationality itself, there is no need to posit some sort of mysterious source of 
extra- or non-traditional rationality. In other words, what is required is a distinction 
between metaphysics and epistemology: the metaphysical good as such norms all 
traditions (and indeed all thought and action), but we can only think about the good 
and come to know it in and through traditions.” (Reames 1998: 443, emphasis 
retained) 
 
For MacIntyre, unlike other realists,6 the pragmatic refutation of relativism (i.e. what is the 
status of the claim that there is no truth?) is correct but insufficient in its neglect of the truths 
to which relativism itself points: 
 
“relativism … is one of those doctrines that have been refuted a number of times too 
often. Nothing is perhaps a surer sign that a doctrine embodies some not-to-be-
neglected truth than that in the course of the history of philosophy it should have been 
refuted again and again. Genuinely refutable doctrines only need to be refuted once.” 
(MacIntyre 1987a: 385)  
 
What are the truths to which relativism points? The first is the limits that our historic 
situatedness imposes on our claims to truth.  MacIntyre agrees that we do not have the 
resources a priori to judge, for example, between such constructions as objectivity and 
subjectivity in their relation to ontology, but this does not entail that we could never so judge, 
and it is this latter error into which the perspectivism so prevalent in organization studies 
falls. In contrasting his own position to Gadamer’s, MacIntyre argues: 
 
 “to have become aware of the historically conditioned character of our philosophical 
enquiries and interpretations is not to have escaped from it. There is no standpoint 
outside history to which we can move, no way in which we can move to some 
presuppositionless stance, exempt from the historical situatedness of all thinking … It 
is not incompatible, however, with a recognition of this truth to argue that a great deal 
turns on the nature of our awareness of the contingencies of our historical 
situatedness and that a certain kind of standpoint outside history, can transform our 
relationships to that history.” (MacIntyre 2002: 158) 
 
If, as he argues in line with hermeneutics, agents’ understandings are constituted within 
traditions of language and practice, it is also true (and in this he departs from hermeneutics 
and from relativism) that we may distinguish intelligibly between claims made for truth within 
the traditions which shape language and practice over time. This effort enjoins us to engage 
in two distinct but related types of conflict:  
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“those with critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least key 
parts of those fundamental agreements, and those internal, interpretative debates 
through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be 
expressed and by whose progress a tradition is constituted.” (MacIntyre 1988: 12)7 
 
It is only if MacIntyre can show that conflicts of the former type are resolvable that we have 
grounds to reject the type of incommensurability that constitutes the self-image of so much 
contemporary organization theory. The challenges of this task are difficult to underestimate 
however. MacIntyre holds, alongside hermeneutics, that traditions are the bearers of the 
substantive rationalities on which intelligibility and judgment depend (MacIntyre 1987a, 
1987b, 1987c, 1988). We cannot turn to a system of rationality through which to decide 
between the claims of traditions because rational justification is itself tradition-constituted. 
We can only claim that we have reason to believe in quarks, for example, by seeing how the 
argument for their existence has gone so far and judging the evidential and theoretical claims 
made in their favour against those standards by which we judge such claims, standards that 
themselves have a history against which to judge whether they are the best standards 
against which so to judge. The intelligibility of our claims is also such that what is intelligible 
at an earlier point in a tradition may become unintelligible – the tradition may suffer an 
“epistemological crisis” (Porter 2003: 47) – or at least bear a significantly different meaning 
later on (MacIntyre 1986: 76): 
 
 “For an individual either to be or to appear to be rational is then for that individual to 
participate in the norm-governed transactions and relationships of a particular 
institutionalised social order. Hence ‘rational’ is not a predicate to be applied to 
individuals qua individuals but only to individuals qua participants in particular social 
orders embodying particular conceptions of rationality.” (MacIntyre 1987b: 4)  
 
The intimate relationship between intelligibility in everyday exchange and adherence to some 
tradition of judgment and enquiry is no small point.8 Not to be understood is a form of social 
death which befalls those who step outside some tradition of rationality or whose social 
circumstances bring them into the milieu of an alien tradition. MacIntyre maintains that it is 
only the ability of one tradition to provide better understandings of those conflicts and failings 
of other traditions than they can provide for themselves that enables us to judge (by 
historically established traditional standards) its rational superiority (MacIntyre 1988). This 
can happen only through learning the language and rationality of the other tradition against 
which one aims to make one’s claims. As Porter comments, “We might say that, on 
MacIntyre’s view, the necessity for standing outside of any tradition whatever is obviated by 
the possibility of standing within two traditions at once in order to move between them in a 
comparative assessment of their claims” (2003: 53). Without such a “second first language” 
(MacIntyre 1988: 370-388, 403) the prosecution of such an argument is as fruitless as 
relativists hold – but theirs too is not a position from nowhere.  
 
This argument can barely be made in such abstract terms as we have used and in and of 
itself will convince no-one.  We require instead narratives which demonstrate the ways in 
which encounters between traditions turn out.  For this reason MacIntyre constructs precisely 
such narratives (1967, 1988, 1990a, 2007) and in his intellectual biography of Edith Stein 
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(2004a) recounts the conversions of Stein and a number of her phenomenological associates 
(Reinach, Rosenzweig and Lukács).  
 
Conversions require those who undertake them to understand at least two traditions (despite 
sometimes more and less permeable and precarious boundaries between them) and the 
always open possibility that they might be brought together in the foundational acts and 
testaments of some new tradition. Examples include (supremely for MacIntyre), Aquinas’s 
creative combination of Christian doctrine and Aristotelian teleology and MacIntyre’s own 
creative assimilation of both the Marxist analysis of capitalist society and the historic and 
hermeneutic turn in philosophy within Thomism. MacIntyre suggested in his contribution to 
the Festschrift for Gadamer’s 100th Birthday that “modern Thomism only exhibited an 
awareness of the historical and hermeneutic turn in philosophy relatively late in its history” 
(MacIntyre 2002: 157). The modern Thomist whose life work has best exhibited this turn, is 
MacIntyre himself. As Lutz (2004: 28-29) argues, MacIntyre’s own history of creative 
engagement with traditions itself constitutes an argument for such engagement. 
 
Let us summarise the case we have made so far. Against what Knight (forthcoming) terms 
the conservative phenomenology of practices maintained by hermeneutics which claims that: 
 
 “philosophy is a human experience that remains the same and that characterises the 
human being as such, and that there is no progress in it, but only participation” 
(Gadamer trans. Smith 1986: 6)  
 
and against its adherents in organization theory, stands MacIntyre’s progressive notion of 
practices and the traditions which co-constitute them. These include but are not limited to 
philosophical traditions which provide us with the schemes of rational justification which 
enable us to move towards truth. These traditions can attempt to demonstrate their rational 
superiority over their rivals, however, only if they are capable of maintaining dialogue with 
them such that learning might result (MacIntyre 1988: 388; 2002: 166) in the same way that 
an agent can learn only by being accountable, thereby “rendering him or herself vulnerable to 
dialectical refutation” (MacIntyre 1990a: 200).  
 
1.3. Implications for Research Methods 
 
If the foregoing argument is well founded we should not be surprised to learn that a set of 
philosophical commitments unite MacIntyrean and hermeneutic attitudes towards research 
methods. The intimacy between social structures, social roles (particularly when conceived 
as distinctive characters)9 and the tradition-constituted framework through which notions as 
fundamental as agency and context are understood provides distinctive boundaries around 
the conduct of research. McMylor summarises this well: 
 
 “The key to MacIntyre’s argument, for the sociologist in particular, lies in the view that 
there is no such thing as ‘behaviour’ that can be identified independently of intentions, 
beliefs and settings.” (McMylor 2009:4) 
 
In Chapters 6 – 8 of After Virtue MacIntyre argues from this position to critique both the idea 
of social science and the bureaucratic rationality whose claims it attempts to legitimize.10  
However this is liable to cause some confusion in readers, as Higgins observes: 
 
 “It may be MacIntyre’s special distinction to strike half of his readers as an old 
fashioned universalizing metaphysician (since he defends a version of tradition and 
teleology) while striking the other half as a dangerous relativist.” (Higgins 2004: 35) 
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Such readings err by maintaining conventional usage of both terminology and the constructs 
through which elements of that terminology (e.g. ‘tradition’ and ‘relativism’) are to be inter-
related. For MacIntyre however tradition is an evolving set of debates and relativism is 
(among other things) a falsely derived epistemological conclusion from empirical 
observations. Nevertheless methodological limits are incontestable from what has remained 
almost unchanged in MacIntyre’s writings on epistemology and the conduct of enquiry11 and 
these point to the centrality of considerations of intelligibility, narrative, social structure and 
agency. In earlier collaborative work one of us described these limits in terms of a series of 
systematic exclusions (Coe & Beadle 2008: 10):  
 
• enquiries which do not relate themselves (including the possibility of critically relating 
themselves) to a tradition-constituted community of enquiry 
• enquiries seeking to create law-like generalisations through the testing of hypotheses 
about causation through measurement of a defined list of variables12 
• enquiries which do not report their findings in a narrative form 
• enquiries which exclude agents’ self-understandings in attempting to account for their 
behaviour 
• enquiries which exclude either features of institutions (structure) or the agency of 
subjects in their explanations 
• enquiries which do not recognise the ineliminable presence of the enquirers’ 
judgments in the accounts they present. 
 
The success of our enquiries depends upon our ability to account for the limits imposed by 
both social structure and the self-understandings which social structures characteristically 
exhibit. Ruling out only “positivist conceptions of observability and verifiability” (MacIntyre 
(2004b: 6) whilst encouraging other forms of empirical research offers a wide range of choice 
for researchers in the MacIntyrean tradition. Both primary and secondary work is allowable, 
participant and non-participant observation, and even the presumption against positivist 
hypothesis testing does not preclude quantitative work as such.  
 
When we consider the empirical work that has specifically cited MacIntyre as its inspiration 
an emphasis on ‘thick descriptions’ created through narrative is evident. These include Smith 
(1999), Dunne (1993) and Erben (2000) in education studies, Williams’ (1984) biographical 
narratives with the chronically sick, Coe’s biographical narratives exploring conflicts between 
goods at a major music venue (Coe & Beadle 2008), Crockett’s (2008) structured interviews 
with entrepreneurs, Finchett-Maddock’s (2008) ethnography of squatting, Salter’s (2008) 
ethnography of alternative media, Nicholas’s (2008) auto-ethnographic reflections Eucharistic 
ceremonies and Dungeons and Dragons, Beadle’s (2003) circus auto-ethnography and 
follow-up story-telling narrative (Beadle & Kınyıt 2006, Beadle forthcoming), Moore’s 
(2009a) use of Crockett’s framework in his study of Alliance Boots and his study of churches 
as organizations (2009b), Beabout’s (2008) work on management in monasteries, Dawson’s 
(2009) master-narratives of British healthcare and Martin’s (2009) narratives of 
organizational identity. 
 
Some of this work promises empirical applications of a distinctively MacIntyrean organization 
theory. How would such a theory work and what does it offer organization studies? In Part 
Two we consider MacIntyre’s ‘general theory’ of goods, virtues, practices and institutions and 
consider briefly its relationship with ‘old’ institutionalism. In Part Three we will illustrate this 
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discussion with a worked example to show the impact of a distinctively MacIntyrean reading 
of a case study which exemplifies hermeneutic work in organization studies.  
 
 
Part Two. MacIntyrean Organization Theory 
 
2.1 Goods, virtues, practices and institutions 
 
Having shown what demonstrable victories and defeats constitute for traditions and the 
importance of these encounters for a defensible account of rational justification we now move 
to outline the tradition which MacIntyre claims to have demonstrated superiority through 
engagement with its rivals, that of the virtues (2007). In After Virtue MacIntyre provides his 
definitive account of their essential features - goods, virtues, practices and institutions.13 
 
We began the first part of this paper by distinguishing between the hermeneutic and 
MacIntyrean understandings of practice. In this part we begin again with practice, for it is in 
the relationship between our participation in social practices and the discovery of our good, 
but also in the essential institutionalising of such practices, that MacIntyre’s potential 
contribution to organization theory lies. 
 
For MacIntyre a practice is: 
 
“Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying 
to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended.” (MacIntyre 2007: 187) 
 
Four central concepts inhere in this definition. First, practices are social and co-operative 
activities. Second, the outcome of engagement in practices is the achievement of internal 
goods. MacIntyre later identifies internal goods with both the excellence of the products that 
result from the practice, such as “the excellence in performance by the painters and that of 
each portrait itself” (MacIntyre 2007: 189), and the perfection of the individuals in the process 
of such production (MacIntyre 1994: 284). Third, these standards of excellence have “been 
determined by the historical community of practitioners” (Kallenberg 2003: 21) – “practices 
always have histories” (MacIntyre 2007: 221). So, fourth, practices are systematically 
extended (are “transmitted and reshaped” (ibid.: 221)) through traditions comprising the 
successive rounds of internal conflict about, amongst other things, its own standards of 
excellence. 
 
Practices are widespread, indeed it could be argued that we spend much of our lives in them, 
since they include inter alia “arts, sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian sense, the 
making and sustaining of family life” (MacIntyre 2007: 188). The virtues find their essential 
place in this schema because their deployment is the sine qua non for the achievement of 
the goods internal to practices: 
 
“A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to 
enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of 
which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.” (MacIntyre 2007: 191) 
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Goods internal to practices include not only the generation and delivery of genuinely 
excellent products or services, but also the deployment of the virtues themselves – first to 
attain these goods and later, as desires are transformed, the exercise of the virtues becomes 
constitutive of the agent’s own good; the virtues thus become both means and ends and 
hence undermine that distinction. When developed in this way, virtues that find their initial 
constitution within practices find wider and wider applications within agents’ lives considered 
as a whole such that their self-image becomes a narrative quest for the good. 
 
Goods internal to practices, however, are not the only kind of goods and MacIntyre contrasts 
them with goods external to particular practices such as status, money and power. When 
achieved these are “always some individual's property and possession. [They are] 
characteristically objects of competition in which there must be losers as well as winners” 
(MacIntyre 2007: 190). With internal goods, however, although there is competition in one 
sense, this is competition to excel and so benefits all members of the community engaged in 
the practice (ibid.: 190-191). 
 
In order for internal goods to be realised it is clear that practices need to flourish. To do so, 
however, they require institutions. And institutions are:  
 
“characteristically and necessarily concerned with ... external goods. They are 
involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they are structured in terms of 
power and status, and they distribute money, power and status as rewards. Nor could 
they do otherwise if they are to sustain not only themselves, but also the practices of 
which they are the bearers. For no practices can survive for any length of time 
unsustained by institutions. Indeed so intimate is the relationship of practices to 
institutions – and consequently of the goods external to the goods internal to the 
practices in question – that institutions and practices characteristically form a single 
causal order in which the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always 
vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for 
common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the 
institution. In this context the essential feature of the virtues is clear. Without them, 
without justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting 
power of institutions.” (MacIntyre 2007: 194) 
 
MacIntyre’s description of institutions and their relationship with practices can be applied in 
almost any context, including those to which MacIntyre refers generically as “productive 
crafts” (MacIntyre 1994: 284). The particular practice may be fishing, or producing beef or 
milk, or architecture, or it may be, as we shall discuss below, providing services such as 
medicine. The common feature, however, is that all such activities fall within MacIntyre’s 
definition of a practice as “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity”. But all such practices are institutionalised and MacIntyre provides both a 
warning and some exemplification as follows: “Practices must not be confused with 
institutions. Chess, physics and medicine are practices; chess clubs, laboratories, 
universities and hospitals are institutions” (MacIntyre 2007: 194). A key point for organization 
studies, then, emerges – that, whatever the mode of institutionalization (a point we will return 
to below), any organization may be re-described as a practice-institution combination.14 
 
But this leads us to another important point in MacIntyre’s framework: 
 
                                                 
14
 It is worth noting here that drawing this equivalence between organizations and practice-institution 
combinations does not preclude non-organizational examples of practices being institutionalised. The  
making and sustaining of family life (one of MacIntyre’s example practices) is institutionalised through 
arrangements such as marriage (often referred to as an institution of course), taxation and other fiscal 
allowances, and cultural mores which support it, without it being in any sense an organization. 
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“the making and sustaining of forms of human community – and therefore of institutions 
– itself has all the characteristics of a practice, and moreover of a practice which stands 
in a peculiarly close relationship to the exercise of the virtues …” (MacIntyre 2007: 194, 
emphasis added). 
 
In other words, there is a second practice in any organization which is the practice of making 
and sustaining the institution. And hence those who have, in one sense, outgrown the core 
practice and now represent the institution that houses it, also have the same opportunity to 
exercise the virtues through engaging with that second practice.15 Figure 1 below represents 
an organization as a core practice situated within an institutional framework in which the 























Figure 1. An organization represented as a practice-institution combination together 
with the secondary practice of the making and sustaining of the institution 
 
Both the practice at the core of the practice-institution combination and the practice of 
making and sustaining the institution that houses it have to be managed.17 Figure 2 (based 
upon Moore 2008) shows managerial engagement with both. Managers’ participation in the 
core practice declines with progression in organizational hierarchies, a distancing which 
                                                 
15
 MacIntyre’s condemnation of the character of the distinctively modern and hence emotivist manager 
(2007: 25-29) has been widely discussed (Anthony 1986, Mangham 1995, Brewer 1997, Beadle 2002, 
Moore 2008) but less attention has been paid to the argument that decision-making in practice-
institution combinations requires management of a specific kind. 
16
 It is quite likely that many institutions will house more than one practice. Universities as institutions, 
for example, house parts of many practices in all the different subject areas which are represented. It 
is also possible for practices to extend beyond particular organizations so that the organization houses 
only a part of the practice – the practices of physics and medicine, for example, are housed only partly 
inside universities. For simplicity, however, we assume here a single practice within any particular 
institution. 
17
 A similar point arose in debates over both business (Beadle 2008b) and teaching with MacIntyre’s 
argument that teaching is “not a practice, but a set of skills and habits put to the service of a variety of 
practices. The teacher should think of her or himself as a mathematician, a reader of poetry, an 
historian or whatever, engaged in communicating craft and knowledge to apprentices” (MacIntyre and 
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potentially undermines both their achievement of the internal goods of the core practice and 
the relative attention such goods receive within decision-making. The compensating factor 
for managers, however, is their engagement with the practice of making and sustaining the 
institution from which they may, through the exercise of appropriate virtues, gain the internal 





Figure 2. The relationship of different levels of management with the core practice 
 
The virtuous organization 
 
Following this, we can identify various features of a virtuous organization and, associated 
with this, the responsibilities particularly of senior management for ensuring that these 
features exist and are nurtured. The first requirement of a virtuous organization, in conformity 
with Aristotelian teleology, would be that there is a good purpose for the particular practice-
institution combination that it comprises. Second, the institution would be aware that it is 
founded on and has as its most important function the sustenance of the particular practice 
that it houses and following from this the organization would encourage the pursuit of 
excellence in that practice whatever that may mean for the particular practice in question. 
Third, it would focus on external goods (such as survival, power, profit, reputation or 
success) as both a necessary and worthwhile function of the organization, but only to the 
extent necessary to the sustenance and development of the practice. 
 
Which particular virtues would characterize virtuous organizations? Although we might 
consider a wider list it is clear that justice, courage and truthfulness (MacIntyre 2007: 194, 
cited above) are the sine qua non of MacIntyre’s schema, together with the virtues of integrity 
and constancy (MacIntyre 1999b: 317-318) which refer to their consistent application across 
practices and over time. 
 
The virtuous organization would require courage in order to resist the corrupting power of 
institutions with which it relates and to minimize the effects of the environment on its 
character where these might be damaging.18 It would require justice in order to distribute 
external goods appropriately, to weigh its own advantage with that of the wider community, to 
foster its own excellence through (for example) an allocation of roles that ensures that those 
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who are truly best at particular tasks are appointed to do them, and to generate internal 
harmony through ensuring that subordinates accept the justice of their place (Klein 1988: 
60). Solomon’s (1992) emphasis on trust (by which we should infer the virtue of both offering 
trust to others and being trustworthy oneself) contains within its definition the necessity of 
truthfulness for organizational conduct. 
 
Such virtues would find their institutional embodiment in a number of features (Moore 
2005b). These are the development of a power-balanced structure that would ensure that the 
views and desires of particular constituencies are not privileged over those of others, and 
decision-making systems and processes that enable rational critical dialogue to have the 
effect of countering biases and enabling the questioning of the hitherto unquestioned 
(MacIntyre 1999b: 313). While to some extent outside of its control, the encouragement of a 
supportive culture will also be a feature of the character of a virtuous organization.19 
 
For our purposes here more needs to be said about two of these requirements of the virtuous 
organization. In relation to purpose MacIntyre is clear, as we noted above, that the virtues 
enable the achievement of a person’s telos of eudaimonia (2007: 148) at the individual level. 
But this telos always needs to be re-evaluated (2007: 218-9) because it is only partially 
known – and hence what MacIntyre calls a narrative quest (a storied exploration) is involved 
(MacIntyre says that “the good life for man [sic] is the life spent in seeking for the good life for 
man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand 
what more and what else the good life for man is” (MacIntyre 2007: 219)). This narrative 
quest is necessarily communal and historically extended, a point made well by McCann & 
Brownsberger: 
 
“… the normative character of MacIntyre’s definition of a social practice … is secured 
within a larger account of the moral life as a whole. There must be some telos to 
human life, a vision anticipating the moral unity of life, given in the form of a narrative 
history that has meaning within a particular community’s traditions; otherwise the 
various internal goods generated by the range of social practices will remain 
disordered and potentially subversive of one another. Without a community’s shared 
sense of telos, there will be no way of signifying ‘the overriding good’ by which 
various internal goods may be ranked and evaluated.” (McCann & Brownsberger, 
1990: 227-28) 
 
Translating this to the organizational level, we are left with an empirical question in judging 
the goodness of purpose of a particular organization. And the goodness of purpose is the 
extent to which the internal goods of the practice at the core of the organization contribute to 
the overriding good of the community and the extent to which there is a continuing debate 
within the organization as to what the community’s good is and how goods internal to 
practices contribute to it. 
 
The second requirement that we need to explore further here is the inter-relationship 
between internal and external goods. MacIntyre makes the point that we must rank such that 
goods internal to practices (goods that are valued for their own sake) should be prioritised. 
External goods should be valued only in so far as they enable the achievement of internal 
goods (MacIntyre 1988: 35). But this does not mean that external goods are not goods 
(MacIntyre 2007: 196). 
 
This also leaves us with an empirical question as to the extent to which an organization 
prioritises between the practice and the institution or, in other words, prioritises between 
internal and external goods. But we should note that the virtuous organization is not one 
                                                 
19
 See Moore (2005b) for more on the distinction and relationship between organizational culture and 
character. 
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which prioritises internal goods to the exclusion of external goods, but one that maintains an 
appropriate balance between them. 
 
Preconditions for virtuous organizations 
 
In previous work (Moore & Beadle 2006), we have identified three preconditions for such 
virtuous organizations. Space precludes a detailed consideration of these here, but in 
summary they are as follows. The first precondition is the presence of virtuous agents at the 
level of both the practice and the institution, for without agents who possess and exercise the 
virtues the practice itself would no longer be fostered internally through the pursuit of 
excellence, and at the institutional level the corruption of the institution and the consequent 
distortion of the practice would seem to be inevitable. This is particularly the case for those 
agents who hold decision-making authority in the institution. But the presence of such agents 
at both practice and institutional (managerial) level is clearly insufficient to guarantee the 
presence of organizational virtue. 
 
The second precondition for a virtuous organization is the mode of institutionalization which 
distributes both decision-making authority and decision criteria within institutions. It is clear 
that the same practice may be institutionalized in different forms and MacIntyre notes that, 
“practices are often distorted by their modes of institutionalization, when irrelevant 
considerations relating to money, power and status are allowed to invade the practice” 
(MacIntyre 1994: 289). In other words, we would expect that different institutional forms will 
support to different extents (and possibly even exclude, though see further below) the 
practices which they house. 
 
The third precondition for a virtuous organization relates to the environment in which it is 
situated. It is clear that MacIntyre regards organizations as open systems that are both 
affected by other organizations and able (in both positive and negative ways) to 
compartmentalise themselves from them. It is apparent therefore that a particularly 
significant factor in any organization’s ability to maintain and exercise the virtues is the extent 
to which the environment is more or less conducive to the practice it houses. MacIntyre 
warns: “We should therefore expect that, if in a particular society the pursuit of external 
goods were to become dominant, the concept of the virtues might suffer first attrition and 
then perhaps something near total effacement, although simulacra might abound” (MacIntyre 
2007: 196). Hence, we would expect that an unconducive environment, and in particular one 
that was focused to too great an extent on external goods, would threaten organizational 
virtue. 
 
Empirical questions also arise from this discussion of the three preconditions for 
organizational virtue, for example: the extent to which one or another precondition 
predominates, whether strength in one can offset weakness in another, and the extent to 
which the preconditions are mutually reinforcing. 
 
 
2.2 MacIntyrean and Institutional Theory, and Reasons for Action 
 
The ‘goods – virtues – practices – institutions’ framework points to two central and 
symbiotically related tensions inhering in organizational life: those between practices and 
institutions; and those between the pursuit of goods internal to practices and the pursuit of 
external goods. The common goods of the practice cannot survive for any length of time 
unsustained by successful institutional pursuit of external goods, but practices are also and 




In capitalist business organizations institutionalized in the Anglo-American mode MacIntyre 
has argued that such vulnerability is endemic, to the extent that the institution has, in effect, 
‘won’ over the practice – its justification is the pursuit of external goods – such that “much 
modern industrial productive and service work is organised so as to exclude the features 
distinctive of a practice”, and in such a way that this type of activity is “at once alien and 
antagonistic to practices” (MacIntyre 1994: 286).  
 
Despite this, however, the counter argument has been made (Moore 2005b) that all business 
activities, irrespective of their form of institutionalisation, must contain the vestiges of a 
practice and the virtues to some degree, for if they did not – that is, if the institution had ‘won’ 
so completely that the virtues had suffered “something near total effacement” (MacIntyre 
2007: 196, cited above) – then the institution would have, in effect, killed itself from the inside 
by failing to sustain the practice on which it itself is founded. In other words, while in Anglo-
American capitalist forms of business organization the practice may be potentially and 
continually under threat from the acquisitiveness and competitiveness of the corporation, it 
still exists.20 This counter argument, of course, suggests that MacIntyre is overly pessimistic 
in his assessment. 
 
Similarly, Keat (2008b) has argued that in other forms of capitalism, notably in ‘coordinated’ 
market economies such as Germany and Japan, industrial organization is such as “to be 
highly conducive to the internal goods and standards of excellence central to MacIntyrean 
practices” (ibid.: 77). And Moore (2002) notes that it may be necessary for institutions to 
observe and take corrective action when the practices that they house become so introverted 
and self-satisfied that they no longer set out to achieve “those standards of excellence which 
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity” – as we shall see in Part 
Three. 
 
Hence, in a variety of forms the essential and unavoidable tension between practices and 
institutions persists and plays out as a similar drama. MacIntyre highlights the tension as 
follows:  
 
“the ability of a practice to retain its integrity will depend on the way in which the 
virtues can be and are exercised in sustaining the institutional forms which are the 
social bearers of the practice. The integrity of a practice causally requires the 
exercise of the virtues by at least some of the individuals who embody it in their 
activities; and conversely the corruption of institutions is always in part at least an 
effect of the vices.” (MacIntyre 2007: 195) 
 
The tensions between practices and institutions are evidenced in a wide range of 
organization theory with ‘old’ institutional theory (a distinction from ‘new’ institutionalism 
outlined in Selznick 1996) demonstrating particular sensitivity both to its features and to its 
own value commitments in ways which appear to us to be particularly resonant of 
MacIntyre’s framework.21 Selznick’s summary is especially revealing in this regard. The aim 
of the ‘old institutional theory’ is nothing less than: 
 
“the quest for more effective and humane cooperative systems, including better 
ways of delegating responsibility and insuring accountability” (Selznick 1996: 276).  
                                                 
20
 For a somewhat polemical argument that even Anglo-American capitalism need not be antithetical to 
the pursuit of internal goods through practices, see Dobson (2009). 
21
 There is a keen debate as to whether institutional theory is itself hermeneutic.  Both Stott (1987) and 
Jennings & Greenwood (2003: 199) offer evidence for the hermeneutic roots of institutional theory 
though both Lok & Willmott (2006) and Weick (2003) are heavily critical of new institutional theory’s 
neglect of language and interpretation.  Nevertheless we cite Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2003) use of 
Salancik and Pfeffer’s (1978) institutional account of “behavioural commitment” in Part Three below. 
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Stinchcombe (1997: 17) similarly argues that “the trouble with the new institutionalism is that 
it does not have the guts of institutions in it. The guts of institutions is that somebody really 
cares to hold the organization to the standards and is often paid to do just that”.22 It is in and 
through organizations so conceived that practitioners, possessing and exercising the virtues 
within the core practice (and, for managers, within the institutional practice), realise the 
internal goods available and so are enabled on their narrative quest towards their true telos. 
These are organizations, as Stinchcombe puts it, with guts. 
 
Mapping the terminology of the old institutionalism onto MacIntyrean categories is 
problematic (a reading of Selznick 1992, particularly Part 3, is instructive in this respect) but it 
is clear that they share similar concerns. MacIntyre’s use of the term institution is not 
identical with either old or new institutional theory,23 because his identification of the 
practices-institution nexus offers a new way of conceptualising organizations (and, indeed, 
practice-institution combinations more generally). In identifying the embeddedness of social 
relations in practices, in defining the essential relationship between practices and virtues and 
in identifying institutionalisation as one more practice, MacIntyre opens up organizations as 
essentially moral spaces – locations of moral action by moral agents operating both 
individually and collectively. This identification offers to the ‘old’ institutional theory a 
philosophical foundation which will provide, amongst other things, a surer underpinning of its 
critique of ‘new’ (or as Stinchcombe (1997: 2) alleges ’Durkheimian’) institutionalism in its 
failure to acknowledge its own value orientation.  
 
As we have see there are potentially wide variations in the ways in which we might undertake 
distinctively MacIntyrean organizational analysis, but if the foregoing argument is correct 
none of these could ignore the “for the sake of” (MacIntyre 1988: 131) relationship in respect 
of reasons for action. Rational action is always accountable such that answers to “Why did 
you so act?” questions (ibid.: 131) take the form of a recounting of deliberations (which may 
have been implicit at the time of action itself) in which the actor moves from a notion of the 
good to be pursued to a (series of) judgment(s) about which actions best move the agent 
towards that good. Divorce action from the concept of the good and action is divorced from 
rationality and hence intelligibility: 
 
 “The application of the concept of intelligibility thus presupposes the application of 
the concept of a good, and a good reason is most adequately specified as a reason 
for doing something which will be or achieve some good.’ (MacIntyre 1986: 75) 
 
Our ability to provide reasons for action is learned, however, and one of the important 
features of modes of institutionalisation is therefore the extent to which those who inhabit 
them may learn to become intelligible so that they can offer answers not only to questions 
such as ‘Why did you do that?’ but also to such questions as ‘Why is the reason you gave for 
doing that a good reason?’ It is in this latter type of question that the importance of both 
being able to distinguish between reason-affording arguments and the relevance of different 
types of context becomes apparent. These abilities are fostered by some and undermined by 
other institutional arrangements and participation in practices is itself the sine qua non for 
developing the ability to reason adequately.24 
 
                                                 
22
 There are parallels here with Granovetter’s (1985) notion of “embeddedness” 
23
 We have noted briefly in previous work (Moore & Beadle 2006: 380, 384) the relationship of ‘new’ 
institutional theory to MacIntyrean organization theory, particularly in relation to the environmental 
precondition for organizational virtue. 
24
 MacIntyre’s fullest account of the conditions that are required for our development into independent 
practical reasoners is contained in Dependent Rational Animals (1999a). 
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Institutions may present agents operating within them with formal statements of purpose, 
schematics for decision-making and informal routines (some of which we may call cultural) to 
direct their members in their decision-making and these to varying extents determine both a 
range of intelligible reasons and intelligible actions. MacIntyre’s own work on organizations 
(particularly 1964, 1977 and 1979a) has focussed on formal decision-making in which 
utilitarianism dominates such routines as Cost-Benefit Analysis and Job Evaluation. His 
critiques here as elsewhere (1967: 207-8, 1999b: 325-27) emphasize the reliance of such 
routines on a series of denials and in particular the denial of reasoning about ends.25  
Managers in such contexts bind their reason within the confines of institutionally determined 
purposes; borrowing from Hegel, MacIntyre’s 1964 paper describes this as “the spiritual zoo” 
in which managers “live in separate cages and choose not to ask why there are bars or what 
lies outside them” (1964: 13).26  
 
It is not only utilitarian decision-making routines that impact upon organizational agents’ 
reasoning abilities. MacIntyre cites a number of studies emphasizing cultural power vested in 
authoritative figures and peer groups that disable agents’ abilities to report their reasons for 
action (1986: 72). He notes that none of these studies involved individuals “engaged in or 
developing the abilities acquired in practices” (ibid.: 72), an open invitation for empirical work 
to be undertaken involving just such individuals.  
 
Distinctively MacIntyrean empirics, holding to a notion of the organization as an essentially 
moral space, attempts to determine the relationship between reasons for action directed 
towards the achievement of goods internal and/or external to practices. In one example of 
such work, a decision to elongate the interval between two halves of a circus performance 
was determined to have been taken for the sake of optimising the earning potential of the 
interval despite the damaging consequences of this to the achievement of goods internal to 
the practice of the circus arts (Beadle & Kınyıt 2006: 134).  It is not only, however, in the 
relative weight given to the pursuit of internal and external goods that we can judge the 
extent to which the practice-institution combination is being held in an appropriate balance.  
 
It is of considerable importance to the virtues that to be moved by appropriate reasons for 
action is also to be able to give an adequate account of those reasons for action. It is only 
inasmuch as we are moved to action by the power of the good reasons themselves that we 
become practitioners whose desires are appropriately ordered. Such practitioners are able 
not only to practice but also to account for their reasons for action and therefore to become 
those from whom others can learn within the practice. Contrariwise, not only is it the case 
that our failures as moral agents are failures to be guided by the right reasons27 and that our 
inability to account for our decisions is a sure sign of our failure as moral agents, but also 
that practice-institution combinations which do not require us to participate in the type of 
reasoning in which we are mutually accountable themselves fail in one of their principal 
educative tasks. As we saw above it is only through a certain type of constrained conflict that 
traditions develop and it is only through engaging with the critical and argumentative 
                                                 
25
 MacIntyre’s analysis of this weakness in institutional decision-making has recently been echoed in 
his critique of rational decision theory as an account of individual decision-making (2008b). 
26
 We discuss both the effects of and responsibility for such compartmentalization in Beadle and 
Moore (2006). 
27
 It is important to note here that it is the narrative ordering of our lives that enables us to choose 
between practices – i.e. should one engage in the practice of writing an academic paper in preference 
to collecting one’s child from school? In a useful supplement to the discussion in After Virtue (2007), 
MacIntyre 1986 shows how we learn standards of reasoning within practice but must move beyond 
practice to the narrative ordering of goods in our lives considered as a whole. None of this negates the 
role of good reasons within practices as those generated by and through the tradition informing the 
practice and that have application to all practitioners qua practitioners. If in the course of setting up 
rigging on a boat or in a circus tent I have a good reason for checking the ropes, then so does 
everyone else setting up rigging. 
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resources of our traditions that individual practitioners can come to know what they are 
doing. 
 
A central question for MacIntyrean organizational analysis will therefore be the extent to 
which practice-institution combinations encourage the types of participative enquiry through 
which we learn how to give, receive and question accounts in ways that extend our 
understanding of the goods at which we aim and thereby enable us to take better decisions. 
Sometimes these may be difficult decisions such as withdrawing ourselves from a sports 
team when we have a minor injury or admitting to error or lack of knowledge. It is in our 
failures to recognise that we have good reasons as practitioners to be moved by reasons for 
action which guide the practice, whether through pride, lack of understanding, venality and 
so on, that we fail. Systems of mutual accountability, in which such reasons are 
unacceptable within the accounts we routinely give of our actions, are critical institutional 
protections from the weaknesses and errors of practitioners themselves. 
 
In the first part of this paper we showed how MacIntyre is both a friend and critic of the 
hermeneutic endeavour. In the second we outlined his schema for understanding 
organizations and made some arguments for its proximity to the ‘old’ institutionalism, which 
led to a discussion of reasons for action. In the third part we attempt to demonstrate how a 
MacIntyrean analysis would alter organizational analysis conducted within the hermeneutic / 
institutionalist tradition. The purpose for conducting this exercise would not be served by 
choosing a poor example of this form of work. Instead, we choose what we consider to be a 
very good example of such.   
  
 
Part Three. MacIntyrean Organizational Analysis: A reworking of Weick & Sutcliffe on 
the Bristol RVI 
 
The ‘Bristol Babies’ case, as it came to be known, is that of a preventable tragedy. It 
concerned the conduct of the paediatric cardiac surgery programme at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary (BRI), a teaching hospital in the south west of England, between 1981 and 1995. 
By the end of this period mortality rates rose to become significantly higher than the national 
average. A number of attempts by outside professionals, whistleblowers and parents to raise 
concerns about the unit and the hospital were met with denial and a refusal to investigate by 
senior managers. Eventually, following press and public outcry, the unit’s work was 
suspended and, following a lengthy and detailed public enquiry (Secretary of State for Health 
2001), a number of surgeons and senior managers were dismissed from their posts and 
subsequently removed from their profession (‘struck off’) by the General Medical Council.28  
 
The Inquiry claimed that hospital management operated a “club culture”29 (thereby using 
Handy’s 1985 nomenclature) in which data that should have been used to establish 
significant weaknesses in the programme went unused and the status and relationships of 
senior surgeons, senior managers and bureaucrats at the Department of Health enabled 
them to go unchallenged. One factor in this was the decision to designate BRI as one of nine 
Supra Regional Service (SRS) centres largely on grounds of geography rather than clinical 
expertise (which was identified as being poor in some respects), the physical layout of the 
hospital (which was detrimental to good care), and the case load (BRI’s low case load was 
considered inadequate to maintain sufficient expertise) (Weick & Sutcliffe 2003: 74-5). 
 
One example of this unchallenging attitude was a Department of Health official who, having 
received a dossier of evidence detailing poor practice and avoidable deaths among infants, 
                                                 
28
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/05/98/the_bristol_heart_babies/115367.stm; date 
accessed 21 April 2009. 
29
 Point 8 within the summary (Secretary of State for Health 2001). 
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merely telephoned the Hospital’s Chief Executive, received a verbal assurance and took no 
further action.30 The combination of surgical practices which had not been updated in line 
with the development of procedures elsewhere and institutional forces that prevented 
effective questioning meant that mortality rates (and those of permanent brain injury following 
procedures) remained steady in the unit despite halving elsewhere over the decade from the 
mid 1980s. Parents believed that up to 150 children suffered death or serious injury over the 
period in question.31  
 
A further factor in the organisational context was a CEO whose managerial attitude to clinical 
care was one of ‘hands-off’, if not downright abdication: “You fix it” (Weick & Sutcliffe 2003: 
78). His dismissal of the concerns of principal internal whistleblower, the anaesthetist Dr 
Stephen Bolsin, was similarly on the grounds that this was “a clinical matter” (ibid.: 76). 
Despite the threat he perceived to his own career, Dr Bolsin, explained his actions in the 
following terms: 
 
"In the end I just couldn't go on putting those children to sleep, with their parents 
present in the anaesthetic room, knowing that it was almost certain to be the last 
time they would see their sons or daughters alive."32 
 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2003) interpret the Public Inquiry’s 530 page report through an 
hermeneutic of enactment in which social structures persist as a result of “a cultural mindset 
about risk, danger, and safety that was anchored by a process of behavioural commitment 
that shaped interpretation, action and communication” (ibid: 74). They refer to this as 
“cultural entrapment”. 
 
Drawing on the institutional theorists Salancik & Pfeffer’s (1978) notion of “behavioural 
commitment” in which “behaviour becomes an undeniable and unchangeable aspect of the 
person’s world, and when he makes sense of the environment, behaviour is the point on 
which constructions and interpretations are based” (Weick & Sutcliffe 2003: 77), actors in 
these positions generate rationalisations which work only because they are regarded as 
culturally appropriate (ibid: 78). They cite as an example of this the Inquiry’s finding that at 
BRI explanations for poor performance were about case complexity rather than poor 
practices and these “tenacious justifications” made it harder to learn, discontinue current 
practice and concentrate on evidence that supported rather than detracted from their position 
(ibid: 79). 
 
Drawing on Salancik & Pfeffer once more, the work of the surgical teams is characterised by 
high autonomy, visibility and irrevocability, whose combination required the creation of 
rationales for practices. When the rationales were put to the test they were found to be 
unsupportable, but for too long they persisted because “layers of bureaucrats above the 
surgical unit, people who had some say in the original choice to designate BRI as a center of 
excellence, find their own judgments in jeopardy. The unintended consequence is that the 
whole chain of decision makers comes to support an explanation that makes it difficult for an 
underperforming unit to improve or to stop altogether” (ibid: 80). Behavioural commitments 
thus entrap cultures through institutional processes of rationalization and protection. 
 
Weick & Sutcliffe draw three lessons from this. First that those at the bottom of organizational 
hierarchies feel less pressure “to justify and construct acceptable errant reasons for errant 
actions” (ibid: 80) because they were not involved in the choices that have led to them but, 
because they are dealing with those most affected, they are under immediate pressure to 
                                                 
30
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/1218149.stm; date accessed: 21 April 2009. 
31
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/05/98/the_bristol_heart_babies/149666.stm; date 
accessed 21 April 2009. 
32
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/532006.stm; date accessed 21 April 2009. 
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respond on behalf of the institution: “People at the bottom are torn between justification and 
candor” (ibid: 81). Institutional support for candor and learning rather than justification and 
concealment will have a greater impact amongst those at the bottom of the institution 
because they are not also tempted to justify their own involvement in prior choices. Second, 
the professional autonomy of surgeons and CEOs “works against learning” (ibid: 81). 
Justifications become self perpetuating at higher levels. Third, justificatory interpretation 
worked as it did due to the combination of autonomy, visibility and irrevocability in the 
“committing context” (ibid: 82) and hence, “Accelerated learning, in this view, is more likely 
when the committing context itself is weakened” (ibid.: 82). 
 
They recommend two lessons for hospitals. First that acceptable reasons for action should 
centre on a notion of learning in which fallibility and vulnerability are acknowledged and 
second that hospitals should deliberately weaken the “committing context” of choice, visibility 
and irrevocability so that “people are not forced to justify inadequate performance” (ibid: 82). 
In its place acknowledged interdependence can moderate behavioural commitment to enable 
problems to be identified, errors acknowledged and decisions changed: 
 
 “Thus choice is reframed as a collective responsibility, such that the buck stops 
everywhere. Publicity is reframed as a collective commitment to provide constructive 
feedback to one another in order to improve performance. Irrevocability is reframed 
as a collective responsibility to identify escape routes, contingency plans, and to 
mentally stimulate potential interventions in order to spot potential traps. When 
choice, publicity and irrevocability are treated as collective responsibilities 
necessitated by task interdependence, this spreads responsibility but it does not 
diffuse it … Dogma precludes learning, and it precludes improvement. This is what 
happened at BRI and it need not happen again.” (ibid: 83, emphasis retained) 
 
Weick & Sutcliffe’s article is an excellent example of the use of institutional theory informed 
by hermeneutic commitments, whose focus on the relationship between systems of 
interpretation and action is (to these authors) persuasive. In respect of institutional processes 
and their effects a MacIntyrean analysis would differ only in nomenclature. Where Weick & 
Sutcliffe write of choice, visibility and irrevocability, a MacIntyrean analysis would write of the 
balance of power in institutional structures and the systems and processes through which 
decisions are taken. How, then, would a MacIntyrean analysis differ?  
 
First a MacIntyrean analysis would identify the goods internal to the practice (in this case of 
medicine), what its purpose is held to be in the tradition which constitutes it and thus what 
good reasons for action must be if they are to serve these goods. This is not just a matter of 
language, for in the MacIntyrean view hospitals derive their point and purpose from and only 
from the proper practice of medicine. By contrast, point nine of the Synopsis of the Inquiry 
Report found that “vulnerable children were not a priority” (Secretary of State for Health 
2001). What is absent from Weick & Sutcliffe’s study, but notably not from the Inquiry report, 
the submissions of the affected families and the subsequent actions of the General Medical 
Council, were the ways in which the surgeons themselves failed as practitioners in their 
ability to reason adequately towards this proper purpose. A further element of a MacIntyrean 
analysis would have drawn particular attention to the social and co-operative nature of any 
engagement in practices (the “interdependencies” noted in Weick & Sutcliffe’s conclusion 
(2003: 83)), elements that were missing from the way the two key surgeons behaved in 
relation to their teams (ibid.: 75). Attention to these issues would have sent early warning 
signals that all was not well.  
 
Second a MacIntyrean analysis would draw a sharper distinction between the institution (the 
hospital) and the practice than Weick & Sutcliffe offer. Whilst agreeing with the examples 
given of the ways in which particular forms of institutionalisation can undermine learning by 
corrupting the reasons for action that are legitimate within the practice, a MacIntyrean 
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analysis would also consider the responsibilities of the institutional managers themselves for 
not providing systems and processes adequate to protect against poor performance; as 
noted above, it is partly their responsibility to identify ‘best practice’, potentially by 
comparison with other similar units, and this they signally failed to do. A MacIntyrean 
analysis would also suggest that, just because a particular organization has a good purpose, 
this does not prevent it from constructing a “mode of institutionalisation” which is less than 
supportive of organisational virtue. Weick & Sutcliffe’s conclusions address ways in which 
hospitals might create and support such systems, but their purpose is implicit – if we regard 
organizations as essentially moral spaces then it is clear that the institutional failures they 
describe were also moral failures exaggerated by an inadequate mode of institutionalisation.  
 
Third the actions of the principal whistleblower, Dr Bolsin, in resisting institutional pressure to 
conform, cannot be adequately theorised with the resources Weick & Sutcliffe have at their 
disposal because these neglect the critical role played by individual agency. Equally, the 
contrasting actions of the CEO in abandoning any responsibility for the core practice are 
highlighted by a MacIntyrean account. Such an account, within which individual virtue and 
vice always merits consideration, and in which the “standards of excellence” of the practice 
and their systematic extension are always to the fore, is better equipped to provide an 
adequate explanation. In asking the “for the sake of what?” questions of these two 
practitioners in relation to their reasons for action, it would identify and encourage the virtue 
inherent in Dr Bolsin’s actions and his implicit concern for the internal goods of the practice, 
and it would identify and discourage the “for the sake of the institution” approach of the CEO 
in which short-term expediency was privileged over a proper concern for the core practice. 
 
Fourth a MacIntyrean analysis would draw attention to the environmental setting. The 
decision to designate BRI as a SRS centre despite its lack of expertise, the failure then to put 
in place systems to monitor and support its development, and the implication of bureaucrats 
above the surgical unit in the unit’s explanations, all suggest that the environment was not 
conducive to organisational virtue. A MacIntyrean analysis would have identified the moral 
hazard inherent in the organizational environment and, again, sent warning signals much 
earlier in the saga. 
 
It is the use of distinctively moral and evaluative language that separates such analysis from 
the contemporary space of academic discourse in which technicist neutrality is at home. A 
MacIntyrean analysis cannot but attempt to bridge and thus critique the disciplinary 
boundaries between organizational analysis and organizational ethics. The former without 
the latter is devoid of what Stinchcombe calls “guts”; the latter without the former is reduced 
to wishful thinking. McMylor (2001: 23) argued that MacIntyre’s neglect by sociologists 
reflected his opposition to the dominant liberal assumptions of their practice, including the 
fact/value distinction and the academic authorial voice. The same argument could be made 




Part Four. Conclusion – An Agenda for MacIntyrean Organization Theory 
 
In Part One of this paper we outlined both the family resemblance and distinctiveness of 
MacIntyre’s project from that of philosophical hermeneutics. In Part Two we provided the 
outline of a distinctively MacIntyrean organization theory and suggested resemblances to the 
tradition of ‘old’ institutional theory. In Part Three we illustrated both these resemblances and 
distinctions through the example of Weick & Sutcliffe’s study of the Bristol Babies case. Does 
any of this matter, however? Is there any evidence that MacIntyre’s framework is being used 
by organizational scholars and what does MacIntyrean scholarship have to do to 
demonstrate its potential? 
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What we do not lack is critical engagement with MacIntyre’s ideas in the literature. In 
organization theory a special edition of Organization on MacIntyre’s work appeared in 1995 
(Vol. 2:2) and in 2006 a special edition of Organization Studies on organizations and virtue 
(Vol 27:3) contained significant consideration of his work. Within business ethics debate has 
been joined around MacIntyre and markets (Horvarth 1995, Dobson 1996, 1997, Wicks 
1996, 1997, Dawson & Bartholomew 2003, Keat 2000, 2008a, 2008b), in management 
studies the Weberian character of MacIntyre’s understanding of the manager has received 
attention (Anthony 1986, Mangham 1995, Brewer 1997, Du Gay 1998, Tester 2000, Beadle 
2002, Holt 2006, Moore 2005b, 2008) and a variety of professional literatures have 
witnessed cases being made for their elevation to the status of ‘practice’ (Lambeth 1990 for 
journalism, Sellman 2000 for nursing, Leeper & Leeper 2001 for public relations). Finally 
Beadle & Moore have debated whether business itself can be considered a practice (Moore 
2005a, Beadle 2008b). 
 
What is more encouraging in our view, (and more importantly MacIntyre’s (2008a)), is the 
development of empirical applications of his work (see Part 1.3 above for examples). 
Throughout this paper we have indicated a wide range of empirical questions that arise and 
through which his particular blend of hermeneutics, tradition and ethics can be realised. But 
of all of these possibilities, where might a prioritised agenda for MacIntyrean research lie? 
We may be able to construct a range of classificatory schema through which to describe 
such work in terms of methods, subjects (critical or appreciative), storytelling genres, 
attempts to exemplify the virtues and attempts to test the relationships associated with them 
and so on, but any attempt to prioritise between categories would be fruitless because it 
would either rest on methodological commitments that undermine the breadth of work that 
can be legitimately undertaken under his auspices or it would presume a relationship 
between genre and quality that is itself unsustainable. 
 
In contrast, MacIntyre has suggested that what is important about such studies is their 
“directedness” (2008a: 6); the work must be judged by its purposes in the same way as its 
objects are to be judged. The principal arbiter of directedness is the extent to which we can 
draw lessons for practice (ibid.: 6). We cannot anticipate the success of our endeavours but 
the adoption of a MacIntyrean framework would fall hopelessly into the void of self-
contradiction without an awareness of its own purpose. This then becomes the sine qua non 
of distinctively MacIntyrean research.  
 
Amongst the possibilities that this rejects is any suggestion that a paper such as this, or 
empirical work supporting MacIntyre’s contentions, will convince those whose work is framed 
by other traditions. But such is not its purpose. This observation is pertinent because the 
condition of organization studies reflects closely the conditions whose critique is the object of 
After Virtue. This is of a contemporary social order in which distinctively moral utterance 
exhibits a cleavage between meaning and use such that its characterisation as emotivism 
appears warranted. Debate is rationally interminable, viewpoints abound, reason as 
conceived and practiced is incapable of resolving any substantive matter and yet at the same 
time the standards to which appeal is made are held to be independent of those by whom 
appeal is made. In organization theory we need look no further than our text books, journals 
or even this volume to witness the same. The most convincing texts are those that present 
difference most cogently. 
 
In seeking to overcome, rather than to accept or enjoy this kaleidoscope (Tsoukas & 
Cummings 1997), MacIntyre writes a particular genre of history, one which reconstructs the 
past to explain the fragmentation of the present. To apply such methods to organization 
studies would require a similar historic reconstruction, of the type which engaged the mind of 
 22
that great early institution theorist Tom Burns in the final years of his life.33 In the absence of 
such an undertaking, our purpose in this paper has been to invite readers unfamiliar with 
MacIntyre to seek him out. Inasmuch as our representations of his work have failed to meet 
the standards and meanings of the original, as they surely have, the error is ours, but 
inasmuch as this paper encourages readers to consider or reconsider the work of Alasdair 
MacIntyre himself, the credit is his. 
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